Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of
  diverse parameter-free attacks by Croce, Francesco & Hein, Matthias
Reliable Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness with an Ensemble of Diverse
Parameter-free Attacks
Francesco Croce 1 Matthias Hein 1
Abstract
The field of defense strategies against adversarial
attacks has significantly grown over the last years,
but progress is hampered as the evaluation of ad-
versarial defenses is often insufficient and thus
gives a wrong impression of robustness. Many
promising defenses could be broken later on, mak-
ing it difficult to identify the state-of-the-art. Fre-
quent pitfalls in the evaluation are improper tun-
ing of hyperparameters of the attacks, gradient
obfuscation or masking. In this paper we first
propose two extensions of the PGD-attack over-
coming failures due to suboptimal step size and
problems of the objective function. We then com-
bine our novel attacks with two complementary
existing ones to form a parameter-free, computa-
tionally affordable and user-independent ensem-
ble of attacks to test adversarial robustness. We
apply our ensemble to over 50 models from pa-
pers published at recent top machine learning and
computer vision venues. In all except one of the
cases we achieve lower robust test accuracy than
reported in these papers, often by more than 10%,
identifying several broken defenses.
1. Introduction
Adversarial samples, small perturbations of the input, with
respect to some distance measure, which change the deci-
sion of a classifier, are a problem for safe and robust machine
learning. In particular, they are a major concern when it
comes to safety-critical applications. In recent years many
defenses have been proposed but with more powerful or
adapted attacks most of them could be broken (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b; Athalye et al., 2018; Mosbach et al., 2018).
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) is one of the few
approaches which could not be defeated so far. Recent
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variations are using other losses (Zhang et al., 2019b) and
boost robustness via generation of additional training data
(Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019) or pre-training
(Hendrycks et al., 2019). Another line of work are provable
defenses, either deterministic (Wong et al., 2018; Croce
et al., 2019a; Mirman et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2019) or
based on randomized smoothing (Li et al., 2019; Lecuyer
et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019). However, these are not
yet competitive with the empirical robustness of adversarial
training for datasets like CIFAR-10 with large perturbations.
Due to the many broken defenses, the field is currently in
a state where it is very difficult to judge the value of a new
defense without an independent test. This limits the progress
as it is not clear how to distinguish bad from good ideas.
A seminal work to mitigate this issue are the guidelines
for assessing adversarial defenses by (Carlini et al., 2019).
However, as we see in our experiments, even papers trying
to follow these guidelines can fail in obtaining a proper
evaluation. In our opinion the reason is that at the moment
there is no protocol which works reliably and autonomously,
and does not need the fine-tuning of parameters for every
new defense. Such protocol is what we aim at in this work.
The most popular method to test adversarial robustness is
the PGD (Projected Gradient Descent) attack (Madry et al.,
2018), as it is computationally cheap and performs well in
many cases. However, it has been shown that even PGD can
fail (Mosbach et al., 2018; Croce et al., 2019b) leading to
significant overestimation of robustness: we identify i) the
fixed step size and ii) the widely used cross-entropy loss as
two reasons for potential failure. As remedies we propose i)
a new gradient-based scheme, Auto-PGD, which does not
require a step size to be chosen (Sec. 3), and ii) an alterna-
tive loss function (Sec. 4). These novel tools lead to two
variants of PGD whose only free parameter is the number of
iterations, while everything else is adjusted automatically:
this is the first piece of the proposed evaluation protocol.
Another cause of poor evaluations is the lack of diver-
sity among the attacks used, as most papers rely solely
on the results given by PGD or weaker versions of it like
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Of different nature are
for example two existing attacks: the white-box FAB-attack
(Croce & Hein, 2020) and the black-box Square Attack
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(Andriushchenko et al., 2020). Importantly, these methods
have a limited amount of parameters which generalize well
across classifiers and datasets. In Sec. 5, we combine our
two new versions of PGD with FAB and Square Attack to
form a parameter-free, computationally affordable and user-
independent ensemble of complementary attacks to estimate
adversarial robustness, named AutoAttack.
We test AutoAttack in a large-scale evaluation (Sec. 6) on
over 50 classifiers from 35 papers proposing robust models,
including randomized defenses, from recent leading confer-
ences. Although using only five restarts for each of the three
white-box attacks contained in AutoAttack, in all except
two cases the robust test accuracy obtained by AutoAttack
is lower than the one reported in the original papers (our
slightly more expensive AutoAttack+ is better in all but one
case). For 13 models we reduce the robust accuracy by more
than 10% and identify several broken defenses.
We do not argue that AutoAttack is the ultimate adversarial
attack but rather that it should become the minimal test for
any new defense, since it reliably reaches good performance
in all tested models, without any hyperparameter tuning and
at a relatively low computational cost. At the same time our
large-scale evaluation identifies the current state-of-the-art
and which of the recent ideas are actually effective.
2. Adversarial examples and PGD
Let g : D ⊆ Rd −→ RK be a K-class classifier taking
decisions according to argmax
k=1,...,K
gk(·) and xorig ∈ Rd a point
which is correctly classified by g as c. Given a metric d(·, ·)
and  > 0, the threat model (feasible set of the attack) is de-
fined as {z ∈ D | d(xorig, z) ≤ }. Then z is an adversarial
sample for g at xorig wrt the threat model if
argmax
k=1,...,K
gk(z) 6= c, d(xorig, z) ≤  and z ∈ D.
To find z it is common to define some surrogate function L
such that solving the constrained optimization problem
max
z∈D
L(g(z), c) such that γ(xorig, z) ≤ , z ∈ D (1)
enforces z not to be assigned to class c. In image classi-
fication, the most popular threat models are based on lp-
distances, i.e. d(x, z) := ‖z − x‖p, and D = [0, 1]d. Since
the projection on the lp-ball for p ∈ {2,∞} is available in
closed form, Problem (1) can be solved with Projected Gra-
dient Descent (PGD). Given f : Rd −→ R, S ⊂ Rd and the
problem max
x∈S
f(x), the iterations of PGD are defined for
k = 1, . . . , Niter as x(k+1) = PS
(
x(k) + η(k)∇f(x(k))),
where η(k) is the step size at iteration k and PS is the projec-
tion onto S . Using the cross-entropy (CE) loss as objective
L, (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018) introduced the
Algorithm 1 APGD
1: Input: f , S, x(0), η, Niter, W = {w0, . . . , wn}
2: Output: xmax, fmax
3: x(1) ← PS
(
x(0) + η∇f(x(0)))
4: fmax ← max{f(x(0)), f(x(1))}
5: xmax ← x(0) if fmax ≡ f(x(0)) else xmax ← x(1)
6: for k = 1 to Niter−1 do
7: z(k+1) ← PS
(
x(k) + η∇f(x(k)))
8: x(k+1) ← PS
(
x(k) + α(z(k+1) − x(k))
+(1− α)(x(k) − x(k−1))
)
9: if f(x(k+1)) > fmax then
10: xmax ← x(k+1) and fmax ← f(x(k+1))
11: end if
12: if k ∈W then
13: if Condition 1 or Condition 2 then
14: η ← η/2 and x(k+1) ← xmax
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
so-called PGD-attack, which is currently the most popular
white-box attack. In their formulation η(k) = η for every k,
i.e. the step size is fixed, and as initial point x(0) either xorig
or xorig + ζ is used, where ζ is randomly sampled such that
x(0) satisfies the constraints. Moreover, steepest descent is
done according to the norm of the threat model (e.g. for l∞
the sign of the gradient is used).
3. Auto-PGD: A budget-aware step size-free
variant of PGD
We identify three weaknesses in the standard formulation
of the PGD-attack and how it is used in the context of ad-
versarial robustness. First, the fixed step size is suboptimal,
as even for convex problems this does not guarantee con-
vergence, and the performance of the algorithm is highly
influenced by the choice of its value, see e.g. (Mosbach
et al., 2018). Second, the overall scheme is in general ag-
nostic of the budget given to the attack: as we show, the
loss plateaus after a few iterations, except for extremely
small step sizes, which however do not translate into bet-
ter results. As a consequence, judging the strength of an
attack by the number of iterations is misleading, see also
(Carlini et al., 2019). Finally, the algorithm is unaware of
the trend, i.e. does not consider whether the optimization
is evolving successfully and is not able to react to this.
3.1. Auto-PGD (APGD) algorithm
In our automatic scheme we aim at fixing these issues. The
main idea is to partition the available Niter iterations in an
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initial exploration phase, where one searches the feasible
set for good initial points, and an exploitation phase, during
which one tries to maximize the knowledge so far accumu-
lated. The transition between the two phases is managed by
progressively reducing the step size. In fact, a large step size
allows to move quickly in S, whereas a smaller one more
eagerly maximizes the objective function locally. However,
the reduction of the step size is not a priori scheduled, but
rather governed by the trend of the optimization: if the value
of the objective grows sufficiently fast, then the step size
is most likely proper, otherwise it is reasonable to reduce
it. While the update step in APGD is standard, what distin-
guishes our algorithm from usual PGD is the choice of the
step size across iterations, which is adapted to the overall
budget and to the progress of the optimization, and that,
once the step size is reduced, the maximization restarts from
the best point so far found. We summarize our scheme in
Algorithm 1 and analyze the main features in the following.
Gradient step: The update of APGD follows closely the
classic algorithm and only adds a momentum term. Let η(k)
be the step size at iteration k, then the update step is
z(k+1) = PS
(
x(k) + η(k)∇f(x(k))
)
x(k+1) = PS
(
x(k) + α · (z(k+1) − x(k))
+ (1− α) · (x(k) − x(k−1))
)
,
(2)
where α ∈ [0, 1] (we use α = 0.75) regulates the influence
of the previous update on the current one. Since in the early
iterations of APGD the step size is particularly large, we
want to keep a bias from the previous steps.
Step size selection: We start with step size η(0) at iteration
0 (we fix η(0) = 2), and given a budget of Niter iterations,
we identify checkpoints w0 = 0, w1, . . . , wn at which the
algorithm decides whether it is necessary to halve the current
step size. We have two conditions:
1.
wj−1∑
i=wj−1
1f(x(i+1))>f(x(i)) < ρ · (wj − wj−1),
2. η(wj−1) ≡ η(wj) and f (wj−1)max ≡ f (wj)max ,
where f (k)max is the highest objective value found in the first
k iterations. If one of the conditions is true, then step size
at iteration k = wj is halved and η(k) := η(wj)/2 for every
k = wj + 1, . . . , wj+1.
Condition 1: counts in how many cases since the last check-
point wj−1 the update step has been successful in increasing
f . If this happened for at least a fraction ρ of the total up-
date steps, then the step size is kept as the optimization is
proceeding properly (we use ρ = 0.75).
Condition 2: holds true if the step size was not reduced
at the last checkpoint and there has been no improvement
in the best found objective value since the last checkpoint.
This prevents getting stuck in potential cycles.
Restarts from the best point: If at a checkpoint wj the
step size gets halved, then we set x(wj+1) := xmax, that is
we restart at the point attaining the highest objective fmax
so far. This makes sense as reducing η leads to a more
localized search, and this should be done in a neighborhood
of the current best candidate solution.
Exploration vs exploitation: We want the algorithm to
transit gradually from exploring the whole feasible set S to
a local optimization. This transition is regulated by progres-
sively reducing the step size and by the choice of when to
decrease it, i.e. the checkpoints wj . In practice, we want
to allow a relatively long initial exploration stage and then
possibly update the step size more often moving toward
exploitation. In fact, with smaller step sizes the improve-
ments in the objective function are likely more frequent but
also of smaller magnitude, while the importance of taking
advantage of the whole input space is testified by the suc-
cess of random restarts in the usual PGD-attack. We fix
the checkpoints as wj = dpjNitere ≤ Niter, with pj ∈ [0, 1]
defined as p0 = 0, p1 = 0.22 and
pj+1 = pj +max{pj − pj−1 − 0.03, 0.06}.
Note that the period length pj+1−pj is reduced in each step
by 0.03 but they have at least a minimum length of 0.06.
While the proposed scheme has a few parameters which
could be adjusted, we fix them to the values indicated so
that the only free variable is the budget Niter.
3.2. Comparison of APGD to usual PGD
We compare our APGD to PGD with Momentum in terms
of achieved CE loss and robust accuracy, focusing here
on l∞-attacks with perturbation size . We attack the
robust models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 from (Madry
et al., 2018) and (Zhang et al., 2019b). We run 1000 it-
erations of PGD with Momentum with step sizes /t with
t ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4, 10, 25, 100}, and APGD with a budget of
Niter ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 1000} iterations. In Figure 1
we show the evolution of the current best average cross-
entropy loss and robust accuracy (i.e. the percentage of
points for which the attack could not find an adversarial
example) for 1000 points of the test as a function of itera-
tions. In all cases APGD achieves the highest loss (higher
is better as it is a maximization problem) and this holds for
any budget of iterations. Similarly, APGD attains always
the lowest (better) robust accuracy and thus is the stronger
adversarial attack on these models (see Tables 9, 10 and
11 for a comparison across all models and different losses).
One can observe the adaptive behaviour of APGD: when the
budget of iterations is larger the value of the objective (the
Reliable Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness with an Ensemble of Diverse Parameter-free Attacks
(Madry et al., 2018) (Zhang et al., 2019b)
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Figure 1. PGD with Momentum vs APGD: best cross-entropy loss (top) and robust accuracy (bottom) obtained so far as function of
iterations for the models of (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) for PGD with a momentum term (α = 0.75, as
used in APGD) (dashed lines) with different fixed step sizes (always 1000 iterations) and APGD (solid lines) with different budgets of
iterations. APGD outperforms PGD with Momentum for every budget of iterations in achieved loss and almost always in robust accuracy.
CE loss) increases more slowly, but reaches higher values in
the end. This is due to the longer exploration phase, which
sacrifices smaller improvements to finally get better results.
In contrast, the runs of PGD with Momentum tend to plateau
at suboptimal values, regardless of the choice of the step
size. An analogous comparison of APGD to PGD without
momentum can be found in Sec. A.1 of the Appendix.
4. An alternative loss
If x has correct class y, the cross-entropy loss at x is
CE(x, y) = − log py = −zy + log
( K∑
j=1
ezj
)
, (3)
with pi = ezi/
∑K
j=1 e
zj , i = 1, . . . ,K, which is invariant
to shifts of the logits z but not to rescaling, similarly to its
gradient wrt x, given by
∇xCE(x, y) = (−1 + py)∇xzy +
∑
i6=y
pi∇xzi. (4)
If py ≈ 1 and consequently pi ≈ 0 for i 6= y,
then ∇xCE(x, y) ≈ 0 and finite arithmetic yields
∇xCE(x, y) = 0 (this phenomenon of gradient vanishing
is observed in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a)). Notice that one
can achieve py ≈ 1 with a classifier h = αg equivalent to g
(i.e. they take the same decision for every x) but rescaled
by a constant α > 0. To exemplify how this can lead to
overestimation of robustness, we run 100 iterations of the
Figure 2. Percentage of zeros in the gradients and robust accuracy,
computed by PGD on the CE loss, of the classifiers g/α, where g
is the CIFAR-10 model of (Atzmon et al., 2019) and α a rescaling
factor. The performance of PGD depends on the scale of the logits.
l∞ PGD-attack on the CE loss on the CIFAR-10 model from
(Atzmon et al., 2019), with  = 0.031, dividing the logits
by a factor α ∈ {1, 101, 102, 103}. In Figure 2 we show the
fraction of entries in the gradients of g/α (g is the original
model) equal to zero and the robust accuracy achieved by
the attack in dependency on α (we use 1000 test points, the
gradient statistic is computed for correctly classified points).
Without rescaling (α = 1) the gradient vanishes almost
for every coordinate, so that PGD is ineffective, but simply
rescaling the logits is sufficient to get a much more accurate
robustness assessment (see also Sec. D).
The CW loss (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) defined as
CW(x, y) = −zy +max
i 6=y
zi. (5)
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has in contrast to the CE loss a direct interpretation in terms
of the decision of the classifier. If an adversarial example
exists, then the global maximum of the CW loss is positive.
However, the CW loss is not scaling invariant and thus again
an extreme rescaling could in principle be used to induce
gradient masking.
4.1. Difference of Logits Ratio Loss
We propose the Difference of Logits Ratio (DLR) loss
which is both shift and rescaling invariant and thus has the
same degrees of freedom as the decision of the classifier:
DLR(x, y) = −
zy −max
i 6=y
zi
zpi1 − zpi3
, (6)
where pi is the ordering of the components of z in decreasing
order. The required shift-invariance of the loss is achieved
by having a difference of logits also in the denominator.
Maximizing DLR wrt x allows to find a point classified
not in class y (DLR is positive only if argmaxizi 6= y)
and, once that is achieved, minimizes the score of class
y compared to that of the other classes. If x is correctly
classified we have pi1 ≡ y, so that DLR(x, y) = − zy−zpi2zy−zpi3
and DLR(x, y) ∈ [−1, 0]. The role of the normalization
zpi1 − zpi3 is to push zpi2 to zy = zpi1 as it prefers points for
which zy ≈ zpi2 > zpi3 and thus is biased towards changing
the decision. Furthermore, we adapt our DLR loss to induce
misclassification into a target class t by
Targeted-DLR(x, y) = − zy − zt
zpi1 − (zpi3 + zpi4)/2
. (7)
Thus, we preserve both the shift and scaling invariance of
DLR loss, while aiming at getting zt > zy, and modify the
denominator in (6) to ensure that the loss is not constant.
4.2. APGD versus PGD on different losses
We compare PGD, PGD with Momentum (same momen-
tum as in APGD) and APGD with the same budget on all
deterministic models trained for l∞-robustness used in the
main experiments (see Sections 6 and C) optimizing the
CE, CW and DLR loss (the complete results are reported in
Tables 9, 10, 11 in Sec. C). For both PGD and PGD with
Momentum we use three step sizes (/10, /4, 2, with 
the bound on the norm of the perturbations). APGD out-
performs the best among the 6 versions of PGD on 32 of
the 43 models with CE, 37/43 with CW and 35/43 with
DLR, and the models where APGD is worse are mainly the
ones where the extreme step size 2 is optimal as the de-
fenses lead to gradient masking/obfuscation (further details
in Sec. C.1). The version of standard PGD achieving most
often the lowest robust accuracy is for all three losses PGD
with Momentum and step size /4, with average robust ac-
curacy (over all models) of 54.84%, 50.42% and 50.47% on
the CE, CW and DLR loss respectively. In the same metric,
APGD achieves 54.00%, 49.46%, 48.53%. Comparing CW
and DLR loss per model (over all PGD versions and APGD)
the CW loss is up to 21% worse than the DLR loss, while
it is never better by more than 5% and thus the DLR-loss
is more stable. In total these experiments show: i) APGD
outperforms PGD/PGD with Momentum consistently re-
gardless of the employed loss, ii) our DLR loss improves
upon the CE loss and is comparable to the CW loss, but
with less severe failure cases.
We run a similar comparison for the models trained to be
robust wrt l2 and report the results in Tables 12, 13 and 14.
APGD again yields most often the best results for all the
losses. The difference of the losses is for l2 marginal.
5. AutoAttack: an ensemble of parameter-free
attacks
We combine our two parameter-free versions of PGD,
APGDCE and APGDDLR, with two existing complemen-
tary attacks, FAB (Croce & Hein, 2020) and Square Attack
(Andriushchenko et al., 2020), to form the ensemble AutoAt-
tack, which is automatic in the sense that it does not require
to specify any free parameters1.
Since we want our protocol to be effective, computationally
affordable and general, we select the following variants of
the attacks to compose AutoAttack: APGDCE without ran-
dom restarts, APGDTDLR, i.e. on the Targeted-DLR loss (7),
with 9 target classes, the targeted version of FAB, namely
FABT, with 9 target classes and Square Attack with one run
of 5000 queries. We use 100 iterations for each run of the
white-box attacks. While the runtime depends on the model,
its robustness and even the framework of the target network,
APGD is the fastest attack, as it requires only one forward
and one backward pass per iteration. The computational
budget of AutoAttack is similar to what has been used, on
average, in the evaluation of the defenses considered.
A key property of AutoAttack is the diversity of its com-
ponents: while APGD is a white-box attack aiming at any
adversarial example within an lp-ball, FAB minimizes the
norm of the perturbation necessary to achieve a misclassifi-
cation, and, although it relies on the gradient of the logits, it
appears to be effective also on models affected by gradient
masking as shown in (Croce & Hein, 2020). On the other
hand, Square Attack is a score-based black-box attack for
norm bounded perturbations which uses random search and
does not exploit any gradient approximation. It outperforms
other black-box attacks in terms of query efficiency and
success rate and has been shown to be even competitive
with white-box attacks (Andriushchenko et al., 2020). Both
1AutoAttack is available at https://github.com/
fra31/auto-attack.
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methods have few parameters which generalize well across
models and datasets, so that we will keep them fixed for all
experiments. The diversity within the ensemble helps for
two reasons: first, there exist classifiers for which some of
the attacks dramatically fail, but always at least one of them
works well. Second, on the same model diverse attacks
might have similar robust accuracy but succeed on different
points: then considering the worst case over all attacks, as
we do for AutoAttack, improves the performance.
The hyperparameters of all attacks in AutoAttack are fixed
for all experiments across datasets, models and norms (see
Sec. B of the Appendix). In Sec. 6 we show that AutoAttack
evaluates adversarial robustness reliably and cost-efficiently
despite its limited budget and running fully automatic, with-
out any hyperparameter tuning.
5.1. Untargeted vs targeted attacks
We here discuss why we choose the targeted versions of
APGDDLR and FAB, considering both the scalability and
the effectiveness of the attacks. Note that we keep the untar-
geted formulation of the CE loss, as it is widely used and
achieves the best results for randomized defenses (Table 3).
FAB: The untargeted version of FAB requires to compute at
each iteration the Jacobian matrix of the classifier which has
size scaling linearly with the number of classes K. While
this is feasible for datasets with small K (e.g. MNIST,
CIFAR-10), it becomes both computationally and memory-
wise prohibitive when many classes are given, as in the case
of CIFAR-100 and ImageNet. As a solution we propose to
use the targeted version of FAB, namely FABT, as presented
in (Croce & Hein, 2020), which considers only the lineariza-
tion of the decision boundary between the target and the
correct class, instead of all K − 1 possible hyperplanes as
for untargeted attacks, and thus by fixing additionally the
number of target classes its computational complexity and
memory requirements is independent of K.
Experiments: In Table 1 we compare the untargeted at-
tacks, APGDDLR and FAB, to their respective targeted ver-
sions in terms of the robust accuracy achieved on classifiers
trained with recently proposed adversarial defenses (see
below for details), for different threat models. We use the
untargeted methods with 5 random restarts, the targeted
ones with 9 target classes, those attaining the 9 highest
scores at the original point (excluding the correct one). One
can see that on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet in al-
most all the cases (35/36 for APGDDLR, 29/32 for FAB) the
targeted attacks provide lower (better) results, sometimes
with a large gap especially for APGDTDLR. Although on
MNIST the opposite situation occurs, we show in the next
section that Square Attack is a stronger adversary than both
APGDTDLR and FABT for this dataset, and thus we favor the
targeted attacks when selecting our ensemble in AutoAttack.
6. Experiments
In order to test the performance of AutoAttack, but also the
individual performances of APGDCE and APGDDLR, we
evaluate the adversarial robustness in the l∞- and l2-threat
models of over 50 models of 35 defenses from recent con-
ferences like ICML, NeurIPS, ICLR, ICCV, CVPR, using
MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet as datasets.
We report first results for deterministic defenses (additional
ones with other thresholds  in Sec. C) and then for ran-
domized ones, i.e. classifiers with a stochastic component.
AutoAttack improves almost all evaluations, showing that its
good performance generalizes well across datasets, models
and threat models with the same hyperparameters.
Deterministic defenses: In Tables 2 and 4 (in the Ap-
pendix) we report the results on 49 models, 43 trained for
l∞- and 6 for l2-robustness, from recent defense papers (for
some of them multiple networks are considered, possibly
on more datasets and norms). When possible we used the
originals models (which are either publicly available or we
obtained them via personal communication from the au-
thors). Otherwise we retrained the models with the code
released by the authors. Further details about the models
and papers can be found in the Appendix (Sec. C). For each
classifier we report the clean accuracy and robust accuracy,
at the  specified in the table, on the whole test set (except
for ImageNet where we use 1000 points from the validation
set) obtained by the individual attacks APGDCE, APGDTDLR,
FABT and Square Attack, together with our ensemble Au-
toAttack, which counts as a success every point on which
at least one of the four attacks finds an adversarial example
(worst case evaluation). Additionally, we provide the re-
ported robust accuracy of the respective papers (please note
that in some cases their statistics are computed on a subset of
the test set) and the difference between our robust accuracy
and the reported one. The reduction is highlighted in red in
the last column of Table 2 if it is negative (we get a lower
robust accuracy). Finally, we boldface the attack which
obtains the best individual robust accuracy and underline
those achieving a robust accuracy lower than reported.
Notably, in all but one case AutoAttack achieves a lower
robust accuracy than reported in the original papers, and
the improvement is larger than 10% in 13 out of 49 cases,
larger than 30% in 8 cases (AutoAttack yields also signifi-
cantly lower values on the few models on CIFAR-100 and
ImageNet). Thus AutoAttack would almost always have
provided a better estimate of the robustness of the models
than in the original evaluation, without any adaptation to the
specific defense. In the only case where it does not reduce
the reported robust accuracy it is only 0.03% far from it, and
this result has been obtained with a variant of PGD with 180
restarts and 200 iterations (see (Qin et al., 2019)), which is
way more expensive than our evaluation.
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Table 1. Comparison untargeted vs targeted attacks. We report clean test accuracy and robust accuracy achieved by APGDDLR,
APGDTDLR, FAB and FABT. Moreover, we show the difference between the results of the targeted and untargeted attacks, and boldface it
when is negative (that is the targeted attack is stronger). FAB does not scale to CIFAR-100/ImageNet due to the large number of classes.
# paper clean APGDDLR APGDTDLR diff. FAB FABT diff.
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) 89.69 60.64 59.54 -1.10 60.62 60.12 -0.50
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) 86.46 62.03 56.27 -5.76 58.20 56.81 -1.39
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 87.11 56.96 54.94 -2.02 55.40 55.27 -0.13
4 (Rice et al., 2020) 85.34 55.72 53.43 -2.29 54.13 53.83 -0.30
5 (Qin et al., 2019) 86.28 55.46 52.85 -2.61 53.77 53.28 -0.49
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 87.03 52.65 49.32 -3.33 50.37 49.81 -0.56
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) 87.80 51.68 49.15 -2.53 49.87 49.54 -0.33
8 (Mao et al., 2019) 86.21 50.33 47.44 -2.89 48.32 47.91 -0.41
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 87.20 47.33 44.85 -2.48 45.66 45.39 -0.27
10 (Madry et al., 2018) 87.14 46.03 44.28 -1.75 45.41 44.75 -0.66
11 (Pang et al., 2020) 80.89 44.56 43.50 -1.06 44.47 44.06 -0.41
12 (Wong et al., 2020) 83.34 46.64 43.22 -3.42 44.05 43.74 -0.31
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) 86.11 44.56 41.64 -2.92 42.90 43.44 0.54
14 (Ding et al., 2020) 84.36 50.26 41.74 -8.52 47.18 42.47 -4.71
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 83.11 40.29 38.50 -1.79 39.04 38.97 -0.07
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) 89.98 48.96 37.29 -11.67 40.84 38.48 -2.36
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) 90.25 49.40 37.54 -11.86 40.36 38.99 -1.37
18 (Jang et al., 2019) 78.91 37.01 34.96 -2.05 35.54 35.50 -0.04
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) 91.51 48.41 35.93 -12.48 38.88 35.41 -3.47
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 80.41 35.47 33.70 -1.77 34.08 34.08 0.00
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.80 40.33 33.61 -6.72 33.51 31.19 -2.32
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.82 36.58 29.73 -6.85 31.82 29.10 -2.72
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) 89.16 4.54 1.13 -3.41 1.12 0.71 -0.41
24 (Pang et al., 2020) 93.52 0.49 0.00 -0.49 0.03 0.00 -0.03
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.92 54.04 53.10 -0.94 53.79 53.45 -0.34
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 81.30 44.50 41.16 -3.34 40.92 40.73 -0.19
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) 79.28 31.27 32.34 1.07 79.28 79.28 0.00
CIFAR-100 - l∞ -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 59.23 31.66 28.48 -3.18 - 28.74 -
2 (Rice et al., 2020) 53.83 20.25 18.98 -1.27 - 19.24 -
MNIST - l∞ -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) 98.38 94.77 94.88 0.11 95.60 96.84 1.24
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) 98.34 93.84 93.93 0.09 94.72 97.03 2.31
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 99.48 93.96 93.58 -0.38 94.12 94.62 0.50
4 (Ding et al., 2020) 98.95 94.03 94.62 0.59 94.33 95.37 1.04
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 99.35 94.54 94.16 -0.38 94.12 95.26 1.14
6 (Madry et al., 2018) 98.53 89.75 90.57 0.82 91.75 93.69 1.94
7 (Jang et al., 2019) 98.47 92.15 93.56 1.41 93.24 94.74 1.50
8 (Wong et al., 2020) 98.50 85.39 86.34 0.95 87.30 88.28 0.98
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) 98.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01
ImageNet - l∞ -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 63.4 32.0 27.7 -4.3 - 28.4 -
CIFAR-10 - l2 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) 91.08 74.94 72.91 -2.03 74.13 73.18 -0.95
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 90.83 70.20 69.24 -0.96 69.54 69.46 -0.08
3 (Rice et al., 2020) 88.67 68.95 67.68 -1.27 68.03 67.97 -0.06
4 (Rony et al., 2019) 89.05 67.02 66.44 -0.58 66.81 66.74 -0.07
5 (Ding et al., 2020) 88.02 66.53 66.09 -0.44 66.43 66.33 -0.10
ImageNet - l2 -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 55.3 30.9 28.3 -2.6 - 28.5 -
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Table 2. Robustness evaluation of adversarial defenses by AutoAttack. We report clean test accuracy, the robust accuracy of the
individual attacks as well as the combined one of AutoAttack (AA column). We also provide the robust accuracy reported in the original
papers and compute the difference to the one of AutoAttack. If negative (in red) AutoAttack provides lower (better) robust accuracy.
# paper clean APGDCE APGDTDLR FABT Square AA reported reduct.
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) 89.69 61.74 59.54 60.12 66.63 59.53 62.5 -2.97
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) 86.46 60.17 56.27 56.81 66.37 56.03 56.30 -0.27
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 87.11 57.23 54.94 55.27 61.99 54.92 57.4 -2.48
4 (Rice et al., 2020) 85.34 57.00 53.43 53.83 61.37 53.42 58 -4.58
5 (Qin et al., 2019) 86.28 55.70 52.85 53.28 60.01 52.84 52.81 0.03
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 87.03 51.72 49.32 49.81 58.12 49.25 53.29 -4.04
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) 87.80 51.80 49.15 49.54 58.20 49.12 53.04 -3.92
8 (Mao et al., 2019) 86.21 49.65 47.44 47.91 56.98 47.41 50.03 -2.62
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 87.20 46.15 44.85 45.39 55.08 44.83 47.98 -3.15
10 (Madry et al., 2018) 87.14 44.75 44.28 44.75 53.10 44.04 47.04 -3.00
11 (Pang et al., 2020) 80.89 57.07 43.50 44.06 49.73 43.48 55.0 -11.52
12 (Wong et al., 2020) 83.34 45.90 43.22 43.74 53.32 43.21 46.06 -2.85
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) 86.11 43.66 41.64 43.44 51.95 41.47 46.19 -4.72
14 (Ding et al., 2020) 84.36 50.12 41.74 42.47 55.53 41.44 47.18 -5.74
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 83.11 41.72 38.50 38.97 47.69 38.50 41.4 -2.90
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) 89.98 64.42 37.29 38.48 59.12 36.64 60.6 -23.96
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) 90.25 71.40 37.54 38.99 66.88 36.45 68.7 -32.25
18 (Jang et al., 2019) 78.91 37.76 34.96 35.50 44.33 34.95 37.40 -2.45
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) 91.51 56.64 35.93 35.41 61.30 34.22 57.23 -23.01
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 80.41 36.65 33.70 34.08 43.46 33.70 36.3 -2.60
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.80 59.09 33.61 31.19 64.22 29.35 58.6 -29.25
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.82 69.62 29.73 29.10 66.77 26.93 66.9 -39.97
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) 89.16 8.16 1.13 0.71 33.91 0.28 32.32 -32.04
24 (Chan et al., 2020) 93.79 2.06 0.53 58.13 71.43 0.26 15.5 -15.24
25 (Pang et al., 2020) 93.52 89.48 0.00 0.00 35.82 0.00 31.4 -31.40
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.92 55.28 53.10 53.45 59.43 53.08 56.43 -3.35
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 81.30 79.67 41.16 40.73 47.99 40.22 43.17 -2.95
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) 79.28 39.99 32.34 79.28 20.44 18.50 52.4 -33.90
CIFAR-100 - l∞ -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 59.23 33.02 28.48 28.74 34.26 28.42 33.5 -5.08
2 (Rice et al., 2020) 53.83 20.57 18.98 19.24 23.57 18.95 28.1 -9.15
MNIST - l∞ -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) 98.38 95.32 94.88 96.84 93.97 93.96 96.38 -2.42
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) 98.34 94.79 93.93 97.03 92.88 92.83 93.88 -1.05
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 99.48 93.60 93.58 94.62 92.97 92.81 95.60 -2.79
4 (Ding et al., 2020) 98.95 94.58 94.62 95.37 91.42 91.40 92.59 -1.19
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 99.35 99.10 94.16 95.26 90.86 90.85 97.35 -6.50
6 (Madry et al., 2018) 98.53 90.57 90.57 93.69 88.56 88.50 89.62 -1.12
7 (Jang et al., 2019) 98.47 94.05 93.56 94.74 88.00 87.99 94.61 -6.62
8 (Wong et al., 2020) 98.50 86.68 86.34 88.28 83.07 82.93 88.77 -5.84
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) 98.86 30.50 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 64.25 -64.25
ImageNet - l∞ -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 63.4 31.0 27.7 28.4 46.8 27.6 33.38 -5.78
CIFAR-10 - l2 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) 91.08 74.70 72.91 73.18 83.10 72.91 73.27 -0.36
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 90.83 69.62 69.24 69.46 80.92 69.24 70.11 -0.87
3 (Rice et al., 2020) 88.67 68.58 67.68 67.97 79.01 67.68 71.6 -3.92
4 (Rony et al., 2019) 89.05 66.59 66.44 66.74 78.05 66.44 67.6 -1.16
5 (Ding et al., 2020) 88.02 66.21 66.09 66.33 76.99 66.09 66.18 -0.09
ImageNet - l2 -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 55.3 31.5 28.3 28.5 46.6 28.3 35.09 -6.79
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Table 3. Robustness evaluation of randomized l∞-adversarial defenses by AutoAttack. We report the clean test accuracy (mean and
standard deviation over 5 runs) and the robust accuracy of the individual attacks as well as the combined on of AutoAttack (again over 5
runs). We also provide the robust accuracy reported in the respective papers and compute the difference to the one of AutoAttack (negative
means that AutoAttack is better). The statistics of our attack are computed on the whole test set except for the ones of (Yang et al., 2019),
which are on 1000 test points due to the computational cost of this defense. The  is the same as used in the papers.
# paper model clean APGDCE APGDDLR FAB Square AutoAttack report. reduct.
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Wang et al., 2019) En5RN 82.39 (0.14) 48.81 49.37 - 78.61 45.56 (0.20) 51.48 -5.9
2 (Yang et al., 2019) with AT 84.9 (0.6) 30.1 31.9 - - 26.3 (0.85) 52.8 -26.5
3 (Yang et al., 2019) pure 87.2 (0.3) 21.5 24.3 - - 18.2 (0.82) 40.8 -22.6
4 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 90.99 (0.03) 11.69 15.88 63.07 79.32 9.92 (0.03) 47.6 -37.7
5 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 92.31 (0.04) 9.15 13.85 62.71 79.25 8.15 (0.05) 41.8 -33.6
6 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 92.82 (0.05) 7.19 12.63 66.48 73.12 6.36 (0.06) 19.8 -13.4
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 91.03 (0.05) 49.10 52.55 78.87 89.32 47.97 (0.05) 72.6 -24.6
2 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 92.34 (0.04) 46.08 49.71 78.93 90.17 45.49 (0.04) 67.1 -21.6
3 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 92.82 (0.02) 42.98 47.74 82.92 89.52 42.55 (0.07) 50.8 -8.2
In most of the cases more than one of the attacks included in
AutoAttack achieves a lower robust accuracy than reported
(APGDCE improves the reported evaluation in 21/49 cases,
APGDTDLR in 45/49, FABT in 39/49 and Square Attack in
17/49, but 9/9 on MNIST). APGDTDLR most often attains the
best result for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, Square
Attack on MNIST. Also, APGDTDLR is the most reliable one
as it has the least severe failure which we define as the
largest difference in robust accuracy to the best performing
attack (maximal difference less than 12%, compared to 89%
for APGDCE, 59% for FABT and 70% for Square Attack).
Thus our new DLR loss is able to resist gradient masking.
Randomized defenses: Another line of adversarial de-
fenses relies on adding to a classifier some stochastic com-
ponent. In this case the output (hence the decision) of the
model might change across different runs for the same input.
Thus we compute in Table 3 the mean (standard deviation in
brackets) of our statistics over 5 runs. Moreover the results
of AutoAttack are given considering, for each point, the at-
tack performing better on average across 5 runs. To counter
the randomness of the classifiers, for APGD we compute the
direction for the update step as the average of 20 computa-
tions of the gradient at the same point (known as Expectation
over Transformation (Athalye et al., 2018)) and use the un-
targeted losses (1 run). We do not run FAB here since it
returns points on or very close to the decision boundary, so
that even a small variation in the classifier is likely to undo
the adversarial change. We modify Square Attack to accept
an update if it reduces the target loss on average over 20 for-
ward passes and, as this costs more time we use only 1000
iterations. For the models from (Grathwohl et al., 2020), we
attack that named JEM-0 with 5 restarts with the determin-
istic versions (i.e. without averaging across multiple passes
of the networks), since the stochastic component has little
influence, and then reuse the same adversarial examples on
JEM-1 and JEM-10 (the results of FAB confirm that it is
not suitable to test randomized defenses). Table 3 shows
that AutoAttack achieves always lower robust accuracy than
reported in the respective papers, with APGDCE being the
best performing attack, closely followed by APGDDLR. In
7 out of 9 cases the improvement is significant, larger than
10% (and in 3/9 cases larger than 25%). Thus AutoAttack is
also suitable for the evaluation of randomized defenses.
6.1. Analysis of SOTA of adversarial defenses
While the main goal of the evaluation is to show the ef-
fectiveness of AutoAttack, at the same time it provides an
assessment of the SOTA of adversarial defenses. The most
robust defenses rely on variations or fine-tuning of adversar-
ial training introduced in (Madry et al., 2018). One step for-
ward has been made by methods which use additional data
for training, like (Carmon et al., 2019) and (Alayrac et al.,
2019). Moreover, several defenses which claim SOTA ro-
bustness turn out to be significantly less robust than (Madry
et al., 2018). Interestingly, the most (empirically) resistant
model on MNIST is one trained for obtaining provable cer-
tificates on the exact robust accuracy, and comes with a
verified lower bound on it of 93.32% (Zhang et al., 2020).
While this paper contains up to our knowledge the largest
independent evaluation of current adversarial defenses, this
is by no means an exhaustive survey. Several authors did
not reply to our request or were not able to provide models
(or at least code). We thank all the authors who helped us in
this evaluation. We hope that AutoAttack will contribute to a
faster development of adversarial defenses and recommend
it as part of a standard evaluation pipeline as it is quick and
requires no hyperparameter tuninig.
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A. Auto-PGD
In the main paper we compare in Sec. 3.2 the performance of
Auto-PGD versus PGD with Momentum with different fixed
step sizes as a function of the iterations to show that Auto-
PGD adapts automatically to a given budget of iterations and
to a good step size, achieving larger (better) loss and smaller
(better) robust test accuracy than PGD with momentum.
In Sec. A.1 we show that the same holds if we compare
Auto-PGD to PGD (without momentum). Moreover, we
provide in Sec. C.1 a full comparison of PGD, PGD with
Momentum, both with three different step sizes, and Auto-
PGD. It turns out that Auto-PGD outperforms PGD with a
fixed step size showing again that the automatic adaptation
of Auto-PGD works well.
A.1. Comparison of APGD to PGD
We repeat the experiment of Sec. 3.2, this time comparing
the performance of APGD to that of PGD for various fixed
step sizes as a function of the iterations.
The results of the comparison of APGD vs PGD (without
momentum) are shown in Figure 3. PGD without momen-
tum achieves significantly smaller loss values on MNIST
and also worse robust accuracy than PGD with Momen-
tum and in particular APGD. Apart from this the behavior
of PGD with fixed step size is very similar to the one of
PGD with momentum where as we see that the loss and
robust accuracy plateau quickly while APGD manages to
get still improvements. In general, APGD outperforms PGD
in terms of both loss and robust accuracy.
B. AutoAttack: implementation details
We report all the hyperparameters used in AutoAttack. For
APGD, we use as direction in the update step the sign of the
gradient for the l∞-threat model and, as common in liter-
ature (see e.g. (Tsipras et al., 2019)), the normalized (wrt
l2) gradient for the l2-threat model. Moreover, we set the
momentum coefficient to α = 0.75, ρ = 0.75 (Condition 1),
initial step size η(0) = 2 where  is the maximum lp-norm
of the perturbations. For FAB we keep the standard hyper-
parameters according to the implementation of Advertorch2
(Ding et al., 2019). For Square Attack we follow the origi-
nal code3, using as initial value for the size of the squares
p = 0.8. Moreover, we use the piecewise constant schedule
for p as it is suggested for a query limit of 10000 without
any rescaling (although we use only up to 5000 queries).
2https://github.com/BorealisAI/advertorch
3https://github.com/max-andr/
square-attack
C. Experiments
Deterministic defenses: We report in Table 4 the results
for the deterministic defenses wrt l∞ omitted in Sec. 6, in-
volving CIFAR-10 models with less common thresholds ,
with the same statistics as in Table 2. We add in Tables 5
and 6 (for l∞- and l2-defenses respectively) more details
about the classifiers and papers considered in our evalua-
tion: the venue where each paper appeared (we add ”R” to
indicate that the paper was submitted at the venue but re-
jected) and the source of the models, that is whether they are
publicly available, we got them via private communication
from the authors or we retrained them according to official
implementations. We also indicate the architecture of the
classifiers: interestingly, larger models do not imply better
robustness.
The models of (Pang et al., 2019) and (Pang et al., 2020)
appears twice as they are evaluated both with and without
the addition of adversarial training. The models of (Wang
& Zhang, 2019) are the networks named ”R-MOSA-LA-4”
and ”R-MC-LA-4”.
Randomized defenses: Similar to the deterministic de-
fenses we report additional information which had to be
omitted in Table 3. We report in Table 7 the venue where
each paper appeared and the source of the models, that is if
they are publicly available or we got them via private com-
munication from the authors. In Table 8 we report the mean
and standard deviation of the robust accuracy achieved by
each attack (note that we have a randomized defense thus
the outcome is not deterministic). As mentioned in Sec. 6,
to evaluate an attack we compute 5 times the classification
accuracy of the target model on the same adversarial exam-
ples. For AutoAttack, we form for each test point a batch
with the adversarial examples among those of our different
attacks which were misclassified most often in the 5 runs,
and then compute the robust accuracy of this batch.
For the models of (Grathwohl et al., 2020), only plots of
robust accuracy vs size of the perturbation  are available
in their paper. Thus the reported values are obtained by
extrapolating the values in the tables from the most recent
version of the paper, that is the one available at https:
//arxiv.org/abs/1912.03263v2.
C.1. Comparison PGD vs PGD with Momentum vs
APGD on different losses
We add here more details about the comparison introduced
in Sec. 4.2. In order to compare the performance of APGD
to that of standard PGD when testing adversarial defenses,
we run PGD and PGD with Momentum on the models used
in Sec. 6, with the same budget of APGD, i.e. 100 iterations
and 5 restarts. We use three step sizes: /10, /4 and 2,
where  is the threshold at which the robust accuracy is
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(Madry et al., 2018) (Zhang et al., 2019b)
MNIST -  = 0.3 CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255 MNIST -  = 0.3 CIFAR-10 -  = 0.031
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Figure 3. PGD vs APGD: best cross-entropy loss (top) and robust accuracy (bottom) so far found as function of iterations for the models
of (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) for PGD (dashed lines) with different fixed step sizes (always 1000 iterations)
and APGD (solid lines) with different budgets of iterations. APGD outperforms PGD for every budget of iterations in robust accuracy.
Table 4. Robustness evaluation of additional adversarial defenses by AutoAttack. We report clean test accuracy, the robust accuracy
of the individual attacks and the combined one of AutoAttack (AA column). We also provide the robust accuracy reported in the original
papers and compute the difference to that of AutoAttack. If negative (in red) AutoAttack provides lower (better) robust accuracy.
# paper clean APGDCE APGDTDLR FABT Square AA reported reduct.
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 4/255
1 (Song et al., 2019) 84.81 57.43 56.51 56.86 64.67 56.51 58.1 -1.59
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 0.02
1 (Pang et al., 2019) 91.22 5.02 1.74 2.45 29.52 1.02 34.0 -32.98
2 (Pang et al., 2019) 93.44 0.18 0.01 0.06 88.55 0.00 30.4 -30.40
computed. We repeat the experiment for the CE (Tables 9
and 12), CW (Tables 10 and 13) and DLR loss (Tables 11
14).
We see that APGD achieves with all losses the lowest (lower
is better) robust accuracy in most of the cases (36 out of
49 with CE loss, 42/49 with CW loss, 39/49 with the DLR
loss). Moreover, while on average PGD with Momentum
and step size /4 is slightly better than the other versions
of PGD, the best version of PGD varies with the classifier,
and in particular there is large variance among the results
obtained by different step sizes. This emphasizes again why
a step size free method is essential for a reliable robustness
evaluation which is as much as possible independent of the
user.
For the attacks on the CW and DLR loss, the only cases
where PGD is more than 1% better than APGD consists
of cases where the very large step size 2 outperforms all
other step sizes. Note that the stepsize 2 works signif-
icantly worse than the smaller step sizes for most of the
other models. It is likely that these defenses modify the loss
landscape to make it unsuitable for standard gradient-based
optimization, and an informed random search (as PGD with
such a large step size can be seen) works better. The same
happens with the CE loss, where PGD yields the best results
(with a non-negligible gap to APGD) also on the models of
(Kim & Wang, 2020) and (Taghanaki et al., 2019). However,
notice that for these classifiers optimizing the DLR loss is
significantly more effective than using the CE loss. Finally,
in all these cases AutoAttack achieves significantly lower
robust accuracy than any version of PGD as FAB attack is
less affected by this kind of gradient obfuscation.
D. Potential failure cases of APGDCE and
APGDDLR
It is always important to understand in which cases some
attacks do not work. The automatic step size selection in
APGD prevents a lot of the failure cases of PGD with a fixed
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step size. However, clearly both losses are affected when
the gradient information in general is not helpful e.g. the
defense of (Xiao et al., 2020) leads to a discontinuous classi-
fier function and thus APGDCE and APGDDLR overestimate
the robustness (even though they still get much lower robust
accuracy than (Xiao et al., 2020)). However, this particular
defense shows the value of AutoAttack as in this case the
black-box Square Attack which does not rely on gradient
information reveals that this defense is not robust. In fact we
have run Square attack with a query limit of 10000 and 10
random restarts (instead of 5000 and 1 in the experiments)
and got a robust accuracy of 8.0% (on 500 points) compared
to 20.44% in our experiments.
D.1. Cross-entropy loss
As mentioned in Sec. 4, for the cross-entropy loss a problem
is that the loss is not invariant to rescaling of the classifier.
The finite arithmetic leads to the fact that when its gradient,
in Eq. 4, is analytically ∇xCE(x, y) ≈ 0, it becomes in
practice ∇xCE(x, y) = 0, since typically single precision
is used and only exponents roughly in [−127, 127] in the
exponential function can be expressed (recently (Wong et al.,
2020) proposed even half precision). Thus the sign of the
gradient (which in principle is not affected by the magnitude
of the values) becomes zero and one does not get meaningful
ascent directions (known as gradient masking).
However, we highlight that maximizing the CE loss min-
imizes the confidence of the classifier in the correct class.
This helps to test randomized defenses, when misclassifica-
tion alone is not enough for a successful attack.
D.2. Difference-of-Logits Ratio (DLR) loss
As discussed in Sec. 4.2 the DLR loss is the best perform-
ing loss on average when integrated into APGD. As it is
rescaling and shift-invariant it does not suffer from the is-
sues of the cross-entropy loss. In our large scale evaluation
APGDDLR is the best performing attack in the sense that it
has the lowest maximal difference to best performing attack
across all models we tested. However, as discussed above
APGDDLR can potentially perform not very well for discon-
tinuous classifiers as seen in the evaluation of (Xiao et al.,
2020).
Reliable Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness with an Ensemble of Diverse Parameter-free Attacks
Table 5. Robustness evaluation of l∞-adversarial defenses with AutoAttack. For each model, we report architecture, source, venue,
clean accuracy and combined robust accuracy given by AutoAttack (AA column). We also provide the reported robust accuracy in the
original papers and compute the difference to the one of AutoAttack.
# paper model source venue clean AA reported reduct.
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available NeurIPS 19 89.69 59.53 62.5 -2.97
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) WideResNet-106-8 available NeurIPS 19 86.46 56.03 56.30 -0.27
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available ICML 19 87.11 54.92 57.4 -2.48
4 (Rice et al., 2020) WideResNet-34-20 available ICML 20 85.34 53.42 58 -4.58
5 (Qin et al., 2019) WideResNet-40-8 available NeurIPS 19 86.28 52.84 52.81 0.03
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) ResNet-50 available GitHub 87.03 49.25 53.29 -4.04
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) WideResNet-34-10 available IJCAI 19 87.80 49.12 53.04 -3.92
8 (Mao et al., 2019) WideResNet-34-10 authors NeurIPS 19 86.21 47.41 50.03 -2.62
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) WideResNet-34-10 retrained NeurIPS 19 87.20 44.83 47.98 -3.15
10 (Madry et al., 2018) WideResNet-34-10 available ICLR 18 87.14 44.04 47.04 -3.00
11 (Pang et al., 2020) ResNet32 available ICLR 20 80.89 43.48 55.0 -11.52
12 (Wong et al., 2020) ResNet18 available ICLR 20 83.34 43.21 46.06 -2.85
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) WideResNet-34-10 available NeurIPS 19 86.11 41.47 46.19 -4.72
14 (Ding et al., 2020) WideResNet-28-4 available ICLR 20 84.36 41.44 47.18 -5.74
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) WideResNet-28-10 authors CVPR 19 83.11 38.50 41.4 -2.90
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available NeurIPS 19 89.98 36.64 60.6 -23.96
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) WideResNet-28-10 available ICLR 20 R 90.25 36.45 68.7 -32.25
18 (Jang et al., 2019) ResNet20 available ICCV 19 78.91 34.95 37.40 -2.45
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) WideResNet-34-10 available ICLR 20 R 91.51 34.22 57.23 -23.01
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) ResNet18 authors CVPR 19 80.41 33.70 36.3 -2.60
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available ICCV 19 92.80 29.35 58.6 -29.25
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available ICCV 19 92.82 26.93 66.9 -39.97
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) ResNet110 available ICCV 19 89.16 0.28 32.32 -32.04
24 (Chan et al., 2020) WideResNet-34-10 retrained ICLR 20 93.79 0.26 15.5 -15.24
25 (Pang et al., 2020) ResNet110 available ICLR 20 93.52 0.00 31.4 -31.40
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) WideResNet-34-10 available ICML 19 84.92 53.08 56.43 -3.35
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) ResNet18 available NeurIPS 19 81.30 40.22 43.17 -2.95
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) DenseNet121 available ICLR 20 79.28 18.50 52.4 -33.90
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 4/255
1 (Song et al., 2019) ConvNet available ICLR 19 84.81 56.51 58.1 -1.59
CIFAR-10 - l∞ -  = 0.02
1 (Pang et al., 2019) ResNet20 (x3) available ICML 19 91.22 1.02 34.0 -32.98
2 (Pang et al., 2019) ResNet20 (x3) available ICML 19 93.44 0.00 30.4 -30.40
CIFAR-100 - l∞ -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available ICML 19 59.23 28.42 33.5 -5.08
2 (Rice et al., 2020) PreActResNet-18 available ICML 20 53.83 18.95 28.1 -9.15
MNIST - l∞ -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) available ICLR 20 98.38 93.96 96.38 -2.42
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) available ICCV 19 98.34 92.83 93.88 -1.05
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) available ICML 19 99.48 92.81 95.60 -2.79
4 (Ding et al., 2020) available ICLR 20 98.95 91.40 92.59 -1.19
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) available NeurIPS 19 99.35 90.85 97.35 -6.50
6 (Madry et al., 2018) available ICLR 18 98.53 88.50 89.62 -1.12
7 (Jang et al., 2019) available ICCV 19 98.47 87.99 94.61 -6.62
8 (Wong et al., 2020) available ICLR 20 98.50 82.93 88.77 -5.84
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) retrained CVPR 19 98.86 0.00 64.25 -64.25
ImageNet - l∞ -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) ResNet-50 available GitHub 63.4 27.6 33.38 -5.78
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Table 6. Robustness evaluation of l2-adversarial defenses with AutoAttack. For each model, we report architecture, source, venue,
clean accuracy and combined robust accuracy given by AutoAttack (AA column). We also provide the reported robust accuracy in the
original papers and compute the difference to the one of AutoAttack.
# paper model source venue clean AA reported reduct.
CIFAR-10 - l2 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) ResNet-50 authors ECCV 20 91.08 72.91 73.27 -0.36
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) ResNet-50 available GitHub 90.83 69.24 70.11 -0.87
3 (Rice et al., 2020) PreActResNet-18 available ICML 20 88.67 67.68 71.6 -3.92
4 (Rony et al., 2019) WideResNet-28-10 available CVPR 19 89.05 66.44 67.6 -1.16
5 (Ding et al., 2020) WideResNet-28-4 available ICLR 20 88.02 66.09 66.18 -0.09
ImageNet - l2 -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) ResNet-50 available GitHub 55.3 28.3 35.09 -6.79
Table 7. Robustness evaluation of randomized l∞-adversarial defenses by AutoAttack. For each model, we report architecture, source,
venue, clean accuracy and combined robust accuracy given by AutoAttack (AA column). We also provide the reported robust accuracy in
the original papers and compute the difference to the one of AutoAttack.
# paper model source venue clean AutoAttack report. reduct.
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Wang et al., 2019) En5RN authors NeurIPS 19 82.39 (0.14) 45.56 (0.20) 51.48 -5.9
2 (Yang et al., 2019) with AT authors ICML 19 84.9 (0.6) 26.3 (0.85) 52.8 -26.5
3 (Yang et al., 2019) pure authors ICML 19 87.2 (0.3) 18.2 (0.82) 40.8 -22.6
4 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 available ICLR 20 90.99 (0.03) 9.92 (0.03) 47.6 -37.7
5 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 available ICLR 20 92.31 (0.04) 8.15 (0.05) 41.8 -33.6
6 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 available ICLR 20 92.82 (0.05) 6.36 (0.06) 19.8 -13.4
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 available ICLR 20 91.03 (0.05) 47.97 (0.05) 72.6 -24.6
2 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 available ICLR 20 92.34 (0.04) 45.49 (0.04) 67.1 -21.6
3 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 available ICLR 20 92.82 (0.02) 42.55 (0.07) 50.8 -8.2
Table 8. Robustness evaluation of randomized l∞-adversarial defenses by AutoAttack. We report mean and standard deviation over
5 runs of evaluation of the robust accuracy achieved by the adversarial examples crafted by the different attacks, together with their
combination in AutoAttack.
# paper model APGDCE APGDDLR FAB Square AutoAttack
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Wang et al., 2019) En5RN 48.81 (0.16) 49.37 (0.17) - 78.61 (0.19) 45.56 (0.20)
2 (Yang et al., 2019) with AT 30.1 (0.5) 31.9 (0.53) - - 26.3 (0.85)
3 (Yang et al., 2019) pure 21.5 (0.6) 24.3 (0.98) - - 18.2 (0.82)
4 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 11.69 (0.04) 15.88 (0.06) 63.07 (0.21) 79.32 (0.04) 9.92 (0.03)
5 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 9.15 (0.02) 13.85 (0.05) 62.71 (0.17) 79.25 (0.14) 8.15 (0.05)
6 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 7.19 (0.06) 12.63 (0.04) 66.48 (0.34) 73.12 (0.13) 6.36 (0.06)
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-10 49.10 (0.09) 52.55 (0.06) 78.87 (0.16) 89.32 (0.06) 47.97 (0.05)
2 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-1 46.08 (0.04) 49.71 (0.05) 78.93 (0.19) 90.17 (0.03) 45.49 (0.04)
3 (Grathwohl et al., 2020) JEM-0 42.98 (0.10) 47.74 (0.08) 82.92 (0.10) 89.52 (0.13) 42.55 (0.07)
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Table 9. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the cross-entropy loss in the l∞-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the
same used for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100
iterations and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each
model we boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) 89.69 62.01 61.86 63.15 61.98 61.79 61.84 61.47
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) 86.46 60.78 60.72 61.87 60.70 60.58 60.73 59.86
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 87.11 57.24 57.13 57.88 57.28 57.14 57.13 57.00
4 (Rice et al., 2020) 85.34 56.87 56.82 57.55 56.88 56.78 56.81 56.76
5 (Qin et al., 2019) 86.28 55.50 55.48 56.42 55.50 55.47 55.62 55.45
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 87.03 52.06 51.90 53.30 52.08 51.87 51.85 51.52
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) 87.80 51.85 51.75 52.95 51.87 51.65 51.68 51.56
8 (Mao et al., 2019) 86.21 49.71 49.59 50.69 49.72 49.56 49.61 49.39
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 87.20 46.15 46.08 47.18 46.13 46.08 46.04 45.91
10 (Madry et al., 2018) 87.14 44.93 44.83 46.46 44.94 44.81 44.99 44.56
11 (Pang et al., 2020) 80.89 56.02 56.04 56.22 56.02 56.01 56.04 55.91
12 (Wong et al., 2020) 83.34 46.10 45.93 47.45 46.06 45.90 46.03 45.60
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) 86.11 44.45 45.60 48.83 43.63 44.50 47.07 43.30
14 (Ding et al., 2020) 84.36 50.57 50.36 50.16 50.58 50.41 49.66 49.36
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 83.11 41.76 41.71 42.33 41.70 41.68 41.58 41.59
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) 89.98 67.38 66.79 57.31 67.40 66.50 61.15 62.03
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) 90.25 71.69 71.42 62.52 71.77 71.48 68.88 69.36
18 (Jang et al., 2019) 78.91 38.00 37.88 39.72 37.90 37.73 37.90 37.40
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) 91.51 59.16 58.24 51.29 59.12 58.23 54.17 54.80
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 80.41 36.86 36.74 37.92 36.81 36.74 36.61 36.53
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.80 61.92 60.61 54.96 62.05 60.66 56.89 57.19
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.82 69.63 69.10 61.03 69.60 69.06 67.71 67.77
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) 89.16 17.04 13.79 4.39 17.06 13.33 5.57 4.48
24 (Chan et al., 2020) 93.79 1.89 1.89 9.67 1.91 1.90 5.93 1.90
25 (Pang et al., 2020) 93.52 85.72 85.73 85.67 85.72 85.72 86.23 85.58
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.92 55.28 55.24 56.24 55.25 55.21 55.30 55.08
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 81.30 78.94 78.94 78.94 78.94 78.94 78.94 78.94
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) 79.28 36.32 36.03 34.19 36.27 36.04 35.97 32.38
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Song et al., 2019) 84.81 57.42 57.40 57.60 57.42 57.41 57.43 57.43
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.02
1 (Pang et al., 2019) 91.22 7.27 5.96 17.23 7.00 5.44 9.52 3.53
2 (Pang et al., 2019) 93.44 0.36 0.24 3.37 0.41 0.17 1.22 0.04
CIFAR-100 -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 59.23 33.01 32.91 33.17 33.02 32.83 32.76 32.83
2 (Rice et al., 2020) 53.83 20.61 20.57 21.08 20.57 20.52 20.47 20.32
MNIST -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) 98.38 95.25 95.23 95.21 95.06 94.98 94.99 94.58
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) 98.34 94.67 94.58 94.39 94.38 94.23 94.19 93.81
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 99.48 94.07 94.10 95.27 93.97 93.80 94.32 93.14
4 (Ding et al., 2020) 98.95 94.44 94.42 95.96 94.04 93.53 95.43 93.51
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 99.35 98.79 98.83 98.94 98.79 98.83 98.93 98.79
6 (Madry et al., 2018) 98.53 90.75 90.88 91.97 90.37 90.29 91.03 89.40
7 (Jang et al., 2019) 98.47 93.05 93.66 95.34 92.73 92.47 94.47 92.45
8 (Wong et al., 2020) 98.50 87.16 87.40 90.19 86.51 86.30 87.23 84.74
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) 98.86 20.61 20.27 20.23 20.56 20.27 20.43 23.83
ImageNet -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 63.4 31.5 31.4 34.0 31.5 31.4 31.9 30.9
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Table 10. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the CW loss in the l∞-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the same used
for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100 iterations
and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each model we
boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) 89.69 60.73 60.72 62.20 60.73 60.69 61.02 60.48
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) 86.46 61.78 61.85 63.23 61.69 61.61 62.10 61.13
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 87.11 56.44 56.42 57.15 56.45 56.41 56.39 56.20
4 (Rice et al., 2020) 85.34 55.24 55.21 56.04 55.23 55.19 55.26 55.07
5 (Qin et al., 2019) 86.28 55.10 55.10 55.95 55.10 55.11 55.22 54.99
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 87.03 52.24 52.17 53.61 52.26 52.16 52.36 51.94
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) 87.80 51.13 51.07 52.67 51.14 51.03 51.22 50.88
8 (Mao et al., 2019) 86.21 49.88 49.84 51.18 49.88 49.84 50.02 49.71
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 87.20 47.13 47.09 48.27 47.11 47.06 47.08 46.89
10 (Madry et al., 2018) 87.14 45.98 45.82 47.47 45.95 45.77 46.11 45.67
11 (Pang et al., 2020) 80.89 44.40 44.41 45.83 44.41 44.36 44.66 44.11
12 (Wong et al., 2020) 83.34 46.04 45.94 47.72 46.03 45.93 46.26 45.66
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) 86.11 44.89 45.93 49.27 44.16 45.10 47.43 43.90
14 (Ding et al., 2020) 84.36 51.60 51.44 51.09 51.59 51.29 50.63 50.25
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 83.11 40.21 40.18 40.93 40.20 40.16 40.22 40.10
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) 89.98 55.98 55.30 48.59 55.99 55.27 50.91 51.65
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) 90.25 67.00 66.61 57.87 67.02 66.67 64.19 64.46
18 (Jang et al., 2019) 78.91 36.85 36.81 39.32 36.85 36.83 37.30 36.52
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) 91.51 56.85 55.90 50.26 56.94 55.92 52.54 53.04
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 80.41 35.38 35.37 36.86 35.38 35.35 35.48 35.29
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.80 59.93 58.42 52.56 60.01 58.46 54.51 54.77
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.82 66.49 65.86 56.71 66.60 65.76 63.53 63.80
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) 89.16 18.27 14.75 4.42 18.44 14.66 5.46 4.73
24 (Chan et al., 2020) 93.79 1.32 1.28 5.51 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.23
25 (Pang et al., 2020) 93.52 1.88 0.54 1.42 1.59 0.53 0.47 0.11
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.92 54.05 54.06 55.16 54.08 54.03 54.22 53.90
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 81.30 40.37 40.28 42.30 40.36 40.21 40.56 40.05
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) 79.28 35.77 35.53 34.04 36.14 35.31 35.76 32.09
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Song et al., 2019) 84.81 57.54 57.53 57.78 57.52 57.53 57.51 57.49
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.02
1 (Pang et al., 2019) 91.22 7.12 6.09 16.15 6.87 5.57 9.49 3.82
2 (Pang et al., 2019) 93.44 0.47 0.26 3.13 0.42 0.13 1.22 0.12
CIFAR-100 -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 59.23 30.64 30.61 31.19 30.63 30.61 30.56 30.45
2 (Rice et al., 2020) 53.83 20.22 20.21 21.06 20.22 20.22 20.35 19.98
MNIST -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) 98.38 95.22 95.21 95.17 95.10 94.97 95.04 94.61
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) 98.34 94.63 94.48 94.39 94.49 94.12 94.23 93.58
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 99.48 94.40 94.35 95.23 94.18 94.04 94.33 93.35
4 (Ding et al., 2020) 98.95 94.49 94.52 95.85 93.98 93.81 95.38 93.53
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 99.35 94.43 94.69 95.98 94.03 93.74 95.21 92.98
6 (Madry et al., 2018) 98.53 90.82 90.96 91.94 90.39 90.30 91.07 89.39
7 (Jang et al., 2019) 98.47 93.28 93.64 95.26 92.68 92.71 94.49 92.40
8 (Wong et al., 2020) 98.50 87.32 87.55 90.20 86.74 86.62 87.25 84.97
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) 98.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ImageNet -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 63.4 31.7 31.6 34.5 31.7 31.7 32.5 31.5
Reliable Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness with an Ensemble of Diverse Parameter-free Attacks
Table 11. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the DLR loss in the l∞-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the same
used for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100 iterations
and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each model we
boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 8/255
1 (Carmon et al., 2019) 89.69 60.98 60.88 62.41 60.93 60.82 61.25 60.64
2 (Alayrac et al., 2019) 86.46 63.27 63.15 64.71 63.16 63.00 63.55 62.03
3 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 87.11 57.27 57.18 57.98 57.27 57.18 57.22 56.96
4 (Rice et al., 2020) 85.34 55.89 55.86 56.75 55.90 55.85 55.93 55.72
5 (Qin et al., 2019) 86.28 55.73 55.70 56.47 55.73 55.68 55.70 55.46
6 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 87.03 53.13 53.04 54.41 53.09 52.95 53.29 52.62
7 (Kumari et al., 2019) 87.80 51.97 51.92 53.58 51.98 51.89 52.11 51.68
8 (Mao et al., 2019) 86.21 50.79 50.57 52.03 50.74 50.52 50.79 50.33
9 (Zhang et al., 2019a) 87.20 47.70 47.58 48.84 47.71 47.57 47.53 47.33
10 (Madry et al., 2018) 87.14 46.49 46.30 48.13 46.51 46.30 46.58 46.03
11 (Pang et al., 2020) 80.89 44.97 44.91 46.36 44.96 44.87 45.21 44.56
12 (Wong et al., 2020) 83.34 47.20 47.05 48.62 47.18 47.01 47.22 46.64
13 (Shafahi et al., 2019) 86.11 45.46 46.43 50.03 44.74 45.51 47.89 44.56
14 (Ding et al., 2020) 84.36 51.67 51.44 51.46 51.68 51.39 50.93 50.32
15 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 83.11 40.36 40.33 41.29 40.37 40.32 40.43 40.29
16 (Zhang & Wang, 2019) 89.98 55.69 54.73 46.57 55.68 54.68 48.53 48.96
17 (Zhang & Xu, 2020) 90.25 59.16 56.77 46.72 59.13 56.61 49.07 49.43
18 (Jang et al., 2019) 78.91 37.41 37.30 39.77 37.38 37.27 37.69 37.01
19 (Kim & Wang, 2020) 91.51 52.42 51.41 48.09 52.43 51.30 48.51 48.41
20 (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) 80.41 35.57 35.53 37.25 35.57 35.52 35.68 35.47
21 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.80 61.40 53.79 38.23 61.31 53.27 39.16 40.69
22 (Wang & Zhang, 2019) 92.82 54.84 49.01 35.15 54.83 48.62 36.05 36.72
23 (Mustafa et al., 2019) 89.16 22.16 17.10 4.90 22.18 17.42 5.57 4.54
24 (Chan et al., 2020) 93.79 9.52 7.11 10.41 7.56 5.38 5.30 1.20
25 (Pang et al., 2020) 93.52 1.94 0.47 1.75 2.06 0.58 0.75 0.49
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.031
1 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 84.92 54.25 54.20 55.28 54.23 54.16 54.34 54.04
2 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 81.30 57.45 51.99 44.62 56.19 50.03 44.45 44.50
3 (Xiao et al., 2020) 79.28 37.74 36.33 33.46 37.49 36.92 35.80 31.27
CIFAR-10 -  = 4/255
1 (Song et al., 2019) 84.81 57.85 57.83 58.07 57.84 57.83 57.81 57.79
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.02
1 (Pang et al., 2019) 91.22 15.83 13.33 18.98 15.23 12.38 16.31 8.61
2 (Pang et al., 2019) 93.44 1.53 0.98 3.58 1.25 0.68 2.59 0.26
CIFAR-100 -  = 8/255
1 (Hendrycks et al., 2019) 59.23 32.05 31.91 32.14 32.03 31.92 31.70 31.68
2 (Rice et al., 2020) 53.83 20.41 20.34 21.41 20.40 20.33 20.47 20.20
MNIST -  = 0.3
1 (Zhang et al., 2020) 98.38 95.65 95.52 95.26 95.41 95.17 95.14 94.82
2 (Gowal et al., 2019) 98.34 94.93 94.73 94.28 94.72 94.45 94.22 93.87
3 (Zhang et al., 2019b) 99.48 94.84 94.78 95.53 94.63 94.50 94.79 93.89
4 (Ding et al., 2020) 98.95 94.69 94.78 95.80 94.16 94.00 95.40 93.86
5 (Atzmon et al., 2019) 99.35 94.70 94.99 96.32 94.10 93.95 95.53 94.54
6 (Madry et al., 2018) 98.53 91.08 91.21 92.15 90.65 90.51 91.51 89.74
7 (Jang et al., 2019) 98.47 93.19 93.79 94.74 92.72 92.99 94.49 92.15
8 (Wong et al., 2020) 98.50 87.58 87.65 90.40 86.99 86.87 87.74 85.39
9 (Taghanaki et al., 2019) 98.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ImageNet -  = 4/255
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 63.4 32.1 32.1 35.0 32.1 32.1 32.8 32.0
Reliable Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness with an Ensemble of Diverse Parameter-free Attacks
Table 12. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the cross-entropy loss in the l2-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the
same used for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100
iterations and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each
model we boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) 91.08 74.81 74.74 74.60 74.81 74.75 74.63 74.65
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 90.83 69.68 69.65 69.58 69.69 69.63 69.62 69.60
3 (Rice et al., 2020) 88.67 68.64 68.60 68.55 68.64 68.58 68.56 68.53
4 (Rony et al., 2019) 89.05 66.60 66.58 66.63 66.59 66.58 66.58 66.57
5 (Ding et al., 2020) 88.02 66.22 66.21 66.29 66.22 66.21 66.21 66.19
ImageNet -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 55.3 31.9 31.6 31.6 31.9 31.5 31.6 31.5
Table 13. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the CW loss in the l2-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the same used
for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100 iterations
and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each model we
boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) 91.08 74.57 74.54 74.55 74.56 74.55 74.53 74.49
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 90.83 70.08 70.07 70.06 70.08 70.07 70.06 70.06
3 (Rice et al., 2020) 88.67 68.73 68.71 68.72 68.73 68.72 68.71 68.71
4 (Rony et al., 2019) 89.05 67.00 67.00 67.03 67.00 67.00 66.99 66.99
5 (Ding et al., 2020) 88.02 66.55 66.54 66.64 66.55 66.54 66.53 66.54
ImageNet -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 55.3 30.7 30.7 30.8 30.8 30.7 30.7 30.7
Table 14. Comparison PGD vs APGD on the DLR loss in the l2-threat model. We run PGD and PGD with Momentum (the same used
for APGD) on the models tested in Sec. 6, with three different step sizes: /10, /4 and 2. Similarly to APGD, we use 100 iterations
and 5 restarts for PGD, and report the resulting robust accuracy on the whole test set (1000 images for ImageNet). For each model we
boldface the best attack and underline the best version of PGD (i.e. we exclude APGD).
PGD PGD with Momentum
# paper clean /10 /4 2 /10 /4 2 APGD
CIFAR-10 -  = 0.5
1 (Augustin et al., 2020) 91.08 75.06 75.00 74.99 75.06 75.00 74.99 74.94
2 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 90.83 70.20 70.19 70.17 70.20 70.19 70.17 70.20
3 (Rice et al., 2020) 88.67 69.02 69.01 68.96 69.02 69.02 68.94 68.95
4 (Rony et al., 2019) 89.05 67.03 67.02 67.06 67.03 67.02 67.02 67.02
5 (Ding et al., 2020) 88.02 66.61 66.56 66.64 66.61 66.55 66.54 66.53
ImageNet -  = 3
1 (Engstrom et al., 2019) 55.3 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9 31.1 30.9 30.9
